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AGENCY BY ANALOGY:  
A COMMENT ON ODIOUS DEBT 
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
This brief article focuses on how one might think about the phenomenon of 
odious debt from the standpoint of common-law agency. Though this analogy 
has its flaws, some useful insights can be gathered by examining the similarities 
and differences between the two doctrines, especially when contemplating the 
theory of liability in the sovereign context. 
The odious debt phenomenon itself is well described in other literature.1 
Although aspects of agency doctrine appear to hold promise as solutions for 
odious debt incurred by a sovereign borrower, this promise may be offset by 
other agency doctrines. More generally, it is important to keep in mind that 
agency doctrine is more complex than first appearances may suggest. Its 
complexity for present purposes stems largely from its reticulated quality that 
generates web-like interactions among separate doctrines. Each interaction 
poses dilemmas for the application of agency to the odious debt phenomenon. 
In particular, identifying the principal within the sovereign-debt context has 
awkward implications, as does the consensual relationship assumed by 
common-law agency between the principal (however defined) and the agent. 
To illustrate the complexity of comparing odious debt to agency law, this 
article develops a series of comparisons between the consequences of 
borrowing by a sovereign and that by a private corporation afflicted with inept 
or corrupt management. It contrasts the Republic of Ruritania, a sovereign 
borrower, with Zenda Inc., a publicly traded corporation.2 Zenda Inc. has a 
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 1. I rely on the description in Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, Dilemma 
of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007). 
 2. Thinking about the odious debt incurred by Ruritania’s rulers furnished a good excuse to 
reread Anthony Hope’s novel, The Prisoner of Zenda, a late-nineteenth-century classic in the genre of 
adventure fiction. Its English narrator and hero, Rudolf Rassendyll, impersonates his look-alike cousin, 
Prince Rudolf of Ruritania, who has secretly been imprisoned in the Castle of Zenda to prevent his 
coronation as King of Ruritania. Prince Rudolf’s imprisonment was the consequence of a scheme on 
the part of the novel’s chief villain, Michael, the Prince of Strelsau, aided by the odious Rupert of 
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board of directors elected by its shareholders. Its board appoints and keeps in 
office a cohort of senior officers who incur obligations on behalf of the 
corporation. Zenda Inc.’s officers include an autocratic CEO, Rudolf, who 
incurs indebtedness on the corporation’s behalf. In contrast, the government of 
the Republic of Ruritania is elected by voters who are citizens of Ruritania. 
Ruritania’s President, coincidentally also named Rudolf, incurs debt that binds 
Ruritania. Though far from perfect, these comparisons afford us the 
opportunity to think critically about the opaque subject of odious debt in the 
context of more familiar and accessible contract doctrines. 
II 
THE LURE OF AGENCY DOCTRINE 
It is not surprising that scholars who examine the odious debt phenomenon 
turn to domestic agency law as a source of basic concepts and doctrines. Within 
the common-law and civilian traditions, agency relationships are understood as 
ones in which one person’s actions carry legal consequences for another, who 
has consented to representation by the actor.3 Agency doctrine specifies legal 
consequences for agent, principal, and third parties whose interactions with the 
principal are mediated by the agent. Most importantly, these include the 
circumstances that determine whether the legal consequences of the agent’s acts 
are attributed to the principal and the duties that agent and principal owe to 
each other. Contemporary accounts of agency do not depend on merging the 
agent’s legal identity into the principal’s; that an agent retains a legal 
personality distinct from that of the principal underlies the existence of limits 
on the scope of the agency relationship and the principal’s responsibility for 
actions taken by the agent. In contrast, in earlier accounts of agency—most 
notably that of Justice Holmes—an assumed identity between principal and 
agent was crucial.4 More contemporary accounts of agency thus appear to 
correspond to the distinction between a sovereign state and its officers or 
members of its incumbent government, who through their official actions 
represent the state but who retain legal personalities distinct from that of the 
state itself.5 Contemporary accounts of agency also must take into account the 
 
Hentzau. ‘‘Anthony Hope” was the pseudonym of Anthony Hope Hawkins (1863–1933), a barrister 
who also succeeded as a novelist. 
 3. As defined by the Restatement (Third) of Agency, “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that 
arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent 
shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent 
or otherwise consents so to act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). For definitions 
within a contemporary civilian code, see LA. CIV. CODE art. 2987, 2989 (Supp. 2004). On the history of 
the agency provisions in the Code, see Wendell H. Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, Representation, 
Mandate, and Agency: A Kommentar on Louisiana’s New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1999). 
 4. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 232 (1923). 
 5. For this distinction in the context of the odious debt phenomenon, see Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff 
King & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Problem 36 (Centre for International Sustainable 
Development Law Working Paper, Mar. 11, 2003),  available at http://odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/ 
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temporal dimension of a principal’s assessment of the consequences of any 
agent’s actions—that is, the principal’s assessment necessarily reflects how it 
understands its interests at the time of making the assessment, which may 
diverge from any assessment made by the principal at the earlier time of the 
agent’s action. 
Agency doctrine addresses two central problems that are relevant in the 
sovereign-debt context. First is the risk that a principal will use the situational 
advantage that any agency relationship creates as a basis for opportunistic 
speculation to the detriment of third parties with whom the agent deals on the 
principal’s behalf. Time typically elapses between action taken by an agent and 
the point at which the principal may assess whether the legal consequences of 
that action are beneficial or detrimental to the principal’s current interests. A 
principal may find it advantageous to deny that an agent lacked authority to 
take an action at an earlier time when, in retrospect and with the advantage of 
knowledge of subsequent developments, the consequences are ones the 
principal wishes to avoid. Acting through an agent might enable a principal to 
take opportunistic advantage of third parties with whom the agent deals on the 
principal’s behalf because the specifics of the relationship between the agent 
and the principal—and in particular the scope of the agent’s authority as 
communicated to the agent by the principal—are not transparent to the third 
party.6 And if an agent takes action without authority that subsequently appears 
advantageous to the principal, the principal is not likely to object. 
Contemporary agency doctrine mitigates against the risk that a principal will 
opportunistically deny that an agent acted with actual authority through a 
robust doctrine of apparent authority, which protects third parties who 
reasonably believe the agent acts with authority on the basis of manifestations 
by the principal. These manifestations may include placing the agent in a 
position that carries a particular title or customarily is associated with authority 
of a particular scope.7 Thus, if all CEOs in Zenda Inc.’s industry have unilateral 
authority to bind their corporation to agreements to refurbish their own office 
spaces, a contractor whom Rudolf engages to redo his office who does not know 
that Zenda Inc.’s directors have restricted Rudolf’s authority should be able to 
enforce the refurbishing contract against Zenda Inc.8 
Second, not all agents act loyally in the principal’s interest. Moreover, 
agents may—perhaps even with the principal’s interests at heart as the agent 
erroneously then understands them—take action that exceeds or in some other 
way departs from the scope of the agent’s actual authority. Agency doctrine 
 
publications/advancing_the_odious_debt_doctrine.pdf. On the earlier differentiation between a king 
and the office he held, see ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES (1957). 
 6. For fuller development of this point, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. c 
(2006). 
 7. See id. cmt. d & § 3.03 cmt. b. Section 1.03 defines “manifestation.” 
 8. For discussion of the apparent authority of corporate officers and other organizational 
executives, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 cmt. e (2006). 
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responds to the risks of slippage and disloyalty on the part of agents in many 
ways, many of which are beyond the modest scope of this paper. 
Three general points warrant brief introductions. First, although the agent 
did not act with actual authority, a principal may assent to be subject to the 
legal consequences of an agent’s prior action. Ratification is a unilateral act on 
the principal’s part and may occur even though the agent’s action has not been 
beneficial to the principal. Second, if the principal does not ratify an agent’s 
unauthorized action, the third party may nonetheless hold the principal on the 
basis that the agent acted with apparent authority. The principal then has a 
claim against the agent for loss suffered by the principal; the basis for the claim 
is the agent’s breach of his basic duty to act only within the scope of his actual 
authority.9 If the agent breaches other duties owed the principal—in particular  
the agent’s duties of loyalty—many remedies are available to the principal, 
including ones not tied to any showing of loss.10 Rescinding tainted or 
unauthorized transactions that the agent has entered into with third parties is a 
remedial possibility.11 Third, if the agent’s unauthorized action does not bind the 
principal—that is, if the principal does not ratify the action and the third party is 
unable to establish that the agent acted with apparent authority—the third 
party may have a claim against the agent on the basis that the agent breached 
her implied warranty of authority that her action would be effective to bind the 
principal.12 
A. Identifying the Principal 
Determining the identity of the principal poses dilemmas within the 
sovereign-debt context. In terms of the hypothetical entities introduced in this 
article, Buchheit and his coauthors identify, as the principal, the people of 
Ruritania, as opposed to either the government of Ruritania or the state itself.13 
But presumably the state of Ruritania, not its people, is the obligor, the party 
(albeit a legally constructed one) bound to pay the debt resulting from the 
money borrowed by Ruritania’s incumbent government. Likewise, borrowing 
by Zenda Inc.’s incumbent management results in an obligation that binds the 
corporation, not its shareholders or its stakeholders more broadly defined. It is 
Zenda Inc. that is the principal, not those with ownership interests in Zenda 
Inc.  Zenda Inc.’s officers who act on its behalf are its agents in dealings with 
third parties, such as lenders. 
 
 9. Id. at § 8.09. 
 10. See id.  at § 8.01 cmt. d. 
 11. Rescission, of course, carries complications of its own. See infra, note 38. 
 12. Id. at § 6.10. 
 13. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 36 (“[W]e view Ruritania (meaning the country and its 
population over time) in the position of the ‘principal.”). See also id. at 37 (“[v]iewing the people of a 
country as the principal”); id. at 43 (“the principal here (the people)”). In contrast, Khalfan and his co-
authors identify the state as the principal. See Khalfan et al., supra note 5, at 37 (“The government 
would be seen as acting as the agent for the state, which is the principal.”). 
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In the corporate context, agency doctrine has generated a rich body of cases 
addressing the consequences that follow for corporate obligors and their 
shareholders when the corporation is poorly served by its agents, through either 
ill-conceived or corrupt dealings with third parties. These consequences do not 
turn on identifying a corporation’s shareholders as the principal nor are they 
diminished by the formal point that a corporation’s officers (and directors, for 
that matter) owe duties of loyalty to the corporation.14 
It is not self-evident why the principal should be identified differently—that 
is, as the people, rather than as the state—in the context of borrowing by a 
sovereign with inept or corrupt officials. Perhaps identifying the principal as 
Ruritania’s people makes more obvious the point that their interests—or at 
least the interests over time of most of them—have been betrayed by 
Ruritania’s government of the day. Identifying Ruritania’s people as the 
principal also serves to reinforce the point that revenues from taxes they pay 
will service the debt or, more generally, that debt service will displace other 
uses of Ruritanian resources that would be immediately beneficial to its people. 
Such consequences for Ruritania’s people are parallel to those that would be 
borne by the shareholders of Zenda Inc. as a consequence of obligations 
incurred by its management that bind Zenda Inc. Shareholders, of course, do 
not pay taxes to the corporation, but cash distributions to shareholders through 
dividends and share repurchases might well be reduced as Zenda Inc. becomes 
more indebted. 
Moreover, identifying the principal as the people of Ruritania inevitably 
raises the question, Which people? Only those who pay taxes or who will be 
adversely affected when Ruritania reduces public services to service its debt? 
The composition of Ruritania’s people will also shift over time, making the 
people, as opposed the Ruritanian state, less tractable as a principal. This 
difficulty becomes especially vexing in the face of the standard agency prospect 
that a principal may ratify prior action taken by the agent that would not 
otherwise bind the principal. Ratification has the effect of creating, after the 
fact of the agent’s action, the same legal consequences had the agent acted with 
actual authority.15 
B. Responsibility for Sovereign Debt via Ratification 
Suppose that, following Rudolf’s ouster as CEO of Zenda Inc., his successor 
and Zenda Inc.’s board of directors—awakened perhaps from their torpor 
during Rudolf’s term—discover that Rudolf has, acting without either actual or 
apparent authority, committed Zenda Inc. to a still-executory contract with a 
third party. Might Zenda Inc.’s new CEO and its directors ratify Rudolf’s 
action? The contract, although unauthorized, may nonetheless promise to be 
 
 14. For the basis point, see PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, Part V, Introductory Note, at 200 (1994). 
 15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.02(1) (2006). 
06__DEMOTT.DOC 3/14/2008  1:03:20 PM 
162 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:157 
beneficial to Zenda Inc. Even if the new regime assesses the contract as a loser 
from Zenda Inc.’s standpoint, ratifying the contract may still make sense if, for 
example, Zenda Inc. wishes to retain a reputation as a reliable counter-party or 
if it wishes not to antagonize the other party to the contract with which Zenda 
Inc. anticipates future dealings. In any event, ratification requires only 
unilateral action from the principal through a manifestation of assent—which 
need not be made to the third party16—to be bound by the agent’s action. It is 
not additionally requisite that the principal have benefited through the agent’s 
action,17 although a principal who knowingly retains a benefit from an agent’s 
unauthorized action may be held to have ratified that action.18 Knowing 
retention of benefit functions as a basis on which the principal’s consent to the 
action may be inferred. In any event, which of Ruritania’s people may ratify 
what has been done by a present or prior regime? 
Casting the people of Ruritania as the principal raises a further and related 
dilemma. In all likelihood, some of the people of Ruritania may well have 
supported the regime that incurred the debt, just as some may have benefited 
from actions taken by the regime, including the incurrence of debt. Similarly, it 
is likely that Rudolf, the autocratic CEO of Zenda Inc., enjoys or enjoyed the 
support of at least some of its shareholders. At what level of popular support, 
we might wonder, is the conduct of Ruritania’s (let us suppose) corrupt officials 
fairly to be charged to the people of Ruritania? Or should some proportion of 
the consequences fairly be chargeable to Ruritanians, set as a function of the 
degree of popular support? 
Basic agency concepts, in stark contrast, have a yes-or-no, on-or-off quality 
that is profoundly incompatible—almost as an aesthetic matter—with 
proportionality. Likewise, basic agency doctrines operate without regard to 
determinations of fault.19 That is, Zenda Inc. either is or is not affected by the 
legal consequences of its officers’ conduct. The degree to which Zenda’s 
shareholders support the officers is beside the point, as is whether Zenda Inc.’s 
directors or shareholders were somehow at fault in connection with its officer’s 
actions. At least for private-sector principals like Zenda Inc., the stark quality 
of basic agency doctrines underlies the principal’s accountability to third parties 
for actions taken by its agents. 
 
 16. Id. at § 4.01 cmt. b. 
 17. But see Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 43 (in which the Restatement of Agency is quoted as 
characterizing the “general rule of ratification”: “A person may ratify an act . . . by receiving or 
retaining benefits it generated if the person has knowledge of material facts and no independent claim 
to the benefit” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 (g) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 
2003))). 
 18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 cmts. f–g (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003). 
 19. I have argued elsewhere that these properties of agency doctrine may help explain its lack of 
academic fashion for many years. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, When Is a Principal Charged With an 
Agent’s Knowledge, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 319 (2003). 
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C. Responsibility for Sovereign Debt and the In Pari Delicto Defense 
Agency is, of course, not the sole source of general legal doctrine to which 
one might turn for guidance. In contrast to basic agency principles of 
attribution, the common-law defense of in pari delicto may be applied in a 
manner that is sensitive to variations among degrees of culpability. Buchheit 
and his coauthors draw an intriguing analogy between a successor Ruritanian 
government and a corporate receiver, who may be able to recover assets 
improperly transferred to third parties by the corporation’s former controlling 
party.20 In pari delicto may become inapplicable when the wrongdoer is no 
longer in the picture and only innocent investors will benefit from recoveries 
effected by the receiver. The postreform picture in Ruritania may not, by 
contrast, be comparably clear because members or supporters of its former 
government may benefit if Ruritania avoids its debts. Moreover, if the principal, 
for purposes of analysis, is the people, as opposed to the state, the continuing 
presence of citizens complicit with the former regime clouds the analogy with 
corporate receivership. 
The larger contrast with agency doctrine is that in pari delicto is not 
insensitive to degrees of responsibility for an underlying wrong. In a well-
known illustration of this point, the Supreme Court has held that the common-
law defense of in pari delicto should not bar an action for damages for securities 
fraud brought against corporate insiders and broker-dealers by an investor who 
was induced to invest by the defendants’ misrepresentations that they were 
tipping the investor with inside information about the corporation.21 To be sure, 
reasoned the Court, to trade on the basis of what is believed to be an illegal tip 
of inside information would be wrongful, but corporate insiders and broker-
dealers who hatch a scheme to profit by manipulating a stock’s price by making 
misrepresentations to tippees duped into trading are “far more culpable.”22 
Along the same lines, even if some members of the newly reformed Ruritanian 
polity bear some responsibility for actions of the prior regime, the relative 
degree of their responsibility might be contrasted with that of lenders to the 
regime. 
D. The Role of Consent 
The second set of agency dilemmas is a consequence of the basic point that 
agency is a consensual relationship. Under the common law, a relationship is 
not one of agency unless both principal and agent consent that the agent’s  
conduct will carry consequences for the legal position of the other party, the 
 
 20. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 53 (citing Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 21. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 319 (1985). 
 22. Id. at 314. Thus, in pari delicto bars a tippee’s claim only when the tippee bears “at least equal” 
responsibility for “the violations he seeks to redress” and when permitting the defense would not 
interfere significantly with effective enforcement of the securities laws. Id. at 312–13. 
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principal.23 Of course, it is not necessary that the principal consent to be bound 
by the legal consequences of the agent’s conduct on a transaction-by-
transaction basis, just that the principal assent to an ongoing relationship with 
an agent with power to affect the principal’s position. The common-law 
definition also requires that the agent act subject to the principal’s control, an 
element that may become highly attenuated in practice. Thus, neither the 
shareholders nor the directors of Zenda Inc. may as a practical matter exercise 
ongoing control over Zenda’s senior officers. The consensual quality of agency 
relationships often justifies holding the principal to the legal consequences of 
the agent’s conduct. The principal elected to have a relationship with a 
particular agent. It was within the principal’s power to choose another agent; to 
determine how best to structure the relationship with the agent chosen; and to 
control the agent through incentive structures, monitoring systems, and other 
control mechanisms within the principal’s organization. Common-law agency 
also empowers the principal to terminate the agent’s actual authority to deal on 
the principal’s behalf as the principal’s representative, even when the 
termination breaches a contract between principal and agent.24 Thus, the 
principal has a choice on an ongoing basis—albeit one that may be exercised at 
the price of paying damages for breach of contract—whether to continue to be 
represented by any particular agent. 
Consider now how the role of consent figures in the illustrative contrasts 
between Ruritania and Zenda Inc. Zenda Inc.’s board of directors has power to 
terminate the services of its officers, including Rudolf, although perhaps at the 
price of paying damages for breach of contract depending on the reasons for the 
termination and the terms of any employment agreement between Zenda and 
Rudolf. Moreover, the board has this power even if Zenda Inc.’s CEO, Rudolf, 
has chosen the board’s members. Interestingly, a controversial issue at present 
in U.S. corporate governance is the degree to which Zenda Inc.’s directors 
should be insulated from removal by its shareholders, and, relatedly, whether 
each member of Zenda Inc.’s board (in particular, Rudolf) should be removed 
from the board if a majority of shares cast in an election fail to support the 
director’s re-election. 
In contrast, removing Ruritania’s incumbent government may prove much 
more difficult, even if it is, as characterized here, a “republic.” Ruritania likely 
has an elected legislature and a set of executive officers, whether popularly 
elected or appointed. Once elected or otherwise chosen, Ruritania’s public 
officials have a capacity to remain in office—most likely with the cooperation of 
Ruritania’s military forces—that is unavailable even to Rudolf, the most 
autocratic of CEOs at Zenda Inc. 
 
 23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (defining agency as “the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) 
that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent 
manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act”). 
 24. Id. at § 3.10(1). 
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The consensual quality of agency relationships creates a dilemma if the 
circumstances under which a loan could be avoided by Ruritanian citizens turn 
on the reputation of the Ruritanian regime that incurred the debt. Widespread 
knowledge of the regime’s corruption might place a lender on notice and 
require it to investigate to determine how loan proceeds will be used.25 This is 
because agency doctrine does not protect third parties who are in cahoots with a 
corrupt agent, or, who know or have reason to know that the agent’s action is 
self-serving or otherwise disloyal to the principal.26 The dilemma arises as a 
consequence of ratification, which creates the effects of actual authority after 
the agent’s otherwise unauthorized action.27 A knowing failure to repudiate 
what an agent has done is a conventional basis on which the common law finds 
that a principal has ratified the agent’s conduct. Thus, that the Ruritanian 
regime has a reputation for corruption, which justifies imposing a duty of 
inquiry on lenders, also calls into question whether the people of Ruritania have 
ratified borrowings by corrupt officials through knowing acquiescence. If so, 
then the lenders’ conduct appears less problematic. Why should a successor 
government in Ruritania be empowered to avoid a loan that its citizens may 
well have ratified? And Ruritania’s successor government’s affirmative claims 
against the lenders for inducing a breach of fiduciary duty appear much less 
compelling when Ruritanians themselves condoned the officials’ conduct. 
Although Buchheit et al. acknowledge that a principal may condone an 
agent’s self-interested conduct, they characterize as “fanciful” any argument 
that Ruritania’s citizens “would ever have condoned” their official’s conduct.28 
But simply not condoning presents a dilemma. Common-law agency does not 
require a third party to establish that a principal affirmatively condoned an 
agent’s conduct. The determinative question frequently is the inference that 
third parties will draw from the principal’s failure to repudiate the agent’s 
action. It is otherwise too tempting for principals to keep a corrupt agent in 
place while the agent’s efforts seem likely to be worthwhile, then to disown the 
agent when the balance of advantage to the principal has shifted.29 
One might resolve the dilemma by recognizing that the citizens of Ruritania 
lack the power of Zenda Inc.’s board of directors to discipline and discharge 
 
 25. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 44. 
 26. For a fuller explanation see supra,  Part II.B. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 
8.01 cmt. (d)(1) & 8.02 cmt. E (2006). Third parties in cahoots with disloyal agents who act entirely 
adversely to the principal are also denied the benefit of claims and defenses that turn on imputing the 
agent’s knowledge to the principal. See id. at § 5.04 cmt. b. 
 27. Id. at § 4.01. 
 28. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 44. 
 29. Within a principal that is an organization, perspectives may differ among managers at different 
levels of the organizational hierarchy. For a recent example in the securities industry, see Susanne 
Craig & Tom Lauricella, Costly Commissions: How Merrill, Defying Warnings, Let 3 Brokers Ignite a 
Scandal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2006, at A1 & A14. Merrill fired three brokers who helped brokerage 
clients make rapid (but not necessarily illegal) trades in mutual funds, to the disadvantage of long-term 
investors in the funds and the displeasure of the funds themselves and New York’s Attorney General. 
The brokers succeeded against Merrill in arbitration on the basis that local managers knew about their 
activities. 
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agents. Ruritanian citizens’ relationship with Ruritanian officials is not 
meaningfully, for this purpose at least, explained by common-law agency. It 
may not be consensual (or may have been at one point but not thereafter). 
Moreover, Ruritanian citizens lack the power to exercise control over their 
officials on an interim basis that is an additional defining element of common-
law agency. Agency doctrine also provides no basis on which to differentiate 
among Ruritanians, binding only those who assented to the loan. 
Indeed, one might consider characterizing the relationship as one in which 
Ruritania’s officials have usurped the position of principal, such that they 
exercise dominance over their nominal principals, the citizens. Common-law 
agency recognizes situations in which a principal and an agent should be treated 
as one: for example when an agent so controls the principal’s decisionmaking 
that the principal is charged with notice of the agent’s wrongdoing although the 
agent has dealt with the principal on the agent’s own account.30 The 
separateness of the agent from the principal collapses. Somewhat similarly, one 
might argue that a lender to Ruritania—on inquiry notice that its officials 
represent only their own interests—should have only the officials as obligors on 
the debt. 
III 
SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE TRUST DOCTRINE 
Another way of looking at who is responsible for sovereign debt is 
examining the relationships between the Republic of Ruritania, officials of its 
government, and its lenders though a lens defined not by analogies to agency 
but to trust law or to other situations in which courts impose fiduciary duties on 
actors. Officers of Ruritania’s government, if analogized to trustees, would be 
subject to fiduciary duties.31 Thus, a trustee who exercises a power to borrow for 
trust purposes is obliged to act in accord with the trustee’s fiduciary duties.32 
Like agency law, trust law is relevant in this context, not directly, but by 
analogy. The relationships involved do not fit precisely within a conventional 
private-law trust structure. A trust is defined as “a fiduciary relationship with 
respect to property, arising as a result of a manifestation of intention to create 
that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to 
duties to deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at 
least one of whom is not the sole trustee.”33 The Ruritanian context appears to 
lack two defining elements of a trust: (1) a settlor, whose intention it is to create 
the relationship; and (2) a corpus, the property the trust relationship concerns. 
As with the agency-framed analysis, it is helpful to acknowledge these gaps and 
then turn to what may be drawn by analogy from trust law. 
 
 30. See Munroe v. Harriman, 85 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1936). 
 31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003). 
 32. Id. at § 86 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). 
 33. Id. at § 2. 
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In some situations, a settlor-like figure can indeed be identified, perhaps 
most obviously when a government is put in place by a force of liberation 
(whether internal or external) or when a colonial government confers 
independence on a colony and sees to the installation of a postcolonial 
government. And, of course, states themselves do own assets, although property 
ownership is not (typically) an emolument of government service.  One would 
have to acknowledge that service as a governmental official does not effect a 
transfer of title to the property to the official. The relationship between 
governmental officials and a state’s property seems more akin to asset 
management than trusteeship as such. This is so even if a trust is treated as an 
entity, as do many contemporary authorities.34 
An alternative that may prove less awkward than trust doctrine generally is 
the ample body of cases in which courts impose fiduciary duties in relationships 
not formally or conventionally characterized as fiduciary. The results in these 
cases tend to turn on an intensive scrutiny of the facts, framed by a test that 
focuses on such factors as one party’s trust in and vulnerability to the other and 
whether one party elicited the trust of the other. Overall the key issue is 
whether one party justifiably expected loyal service from the other.35 At least in 
some U.S. jurisdictions, the relationship between a public official and that 
official’s constituents has been characterized as fiduciary.36 
IV 
REMEDIAL COMPLEXITY 
Agency doctrine confers a cornucopia of possible remedies on a principal 
whose agent has acted disloyally. Two remedies carry intriguing implications for 
the odious debt phenomenon: (1) cancellation of individual loans and (2) 
remedial pursuit of now-deposed corrupt governmental officials. From the 
perspective of common-law agency, loan cancellation amounts to rescission by 
the principal of a contract to which the agent previously bound the principal. 
Standard agency doctrine dictates that a principal may avoid a contract with a 
third party who participated in the agent’s disloyal conduct.37 Thus, Zenda Inc. 
may avoid a loan contract with a bank when a bribe to its former CEO, Rudolf, 
induced him to commit Zenda Inc. to the loan. But it is also standard restitution 
doctrine that rescission is conditioned on return of property received from the 
 
 34. Id. at cmt. a. 
 35. See Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and 
Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 926 (2006). 
 36. See, e.g., Hobbs, Wall & Co. v. Moran, 109 Cal. App. 316, 319 (1930). 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.02 cmt. E, 8.03 cmt. d (2006). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 193 (promise that tends to induce a breach of fiduciary 
duty is unenforceable on grounds of public policy) & 178, cmt. d, illus. 12 (“A induces B to make an 
agreement to buy goods on credit from A by bribing B’s purchasing agent. A delivers the goods to B. 
A’s bribe tends to induce the agent to violate his fiduciary duty. B’s promise to pay the price is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy. See § 193.”). 
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other party to the extent feasible.38 Moreover, “[r]escission is not forfeiture: the 
fact that the basis of rescission may be the defendant’s fraud does not permit 
the claimant to recover what has been transferred without restoring what has 
been received.”39 Zenda Inc., that is, may not rescind the loan contract and 
retain the loan proceeds it has received. When specific restitution cannot be 
made, the claimant must make restitution of the value of what has been 
received to the extent necessary to avoid unjust enrichment of the claimant.40 
Determining what is necessary to avoid unjust enrichment could, in the odious 
debt context, require exploring the extent to which the proceeds of a 
problematic loan resulted in benefit to the sovereign borrower and its people. 
A principal who discovers that an agent has indulged in fiduciary 
transgressions also has remedies against the agent (most likely the now-former 
agent).  In addition to claims for loss to the principal caused by the agent’s 
disloyalty and benefits illicitly obtained by the agent, the principal’s remedies 
include forfeiture of compensation paid or otherwise due the agent for the 
period of disloyalty.41 Indeed, the principal’s claims against the agent may not 
necessarily require showing that the value to be recovered was tainted by 
disloyal or illegal conduct by the agent. 
For example, suppose that the board of Zenda Inc. agrees to extinguish a 
$25 million loan it made earlier to its CEO, Rudolf, in exchange for Zenda Inc. 
shares with a current market value of $25 million. Unbeknownst to Rudolf (or 
so he claims), Zenda Inc.’s financial statements contain material inaccuracies. 
Once this sad fact comes to light, the market value of its shares plummets. 
Zenda Inc. may rescind its transaction with Rudolf, reinstating the loan and 
returning the shares to him.42 Were the exchange not unwound, Rudolf would 
be unjustly enriched, regardless of whether he knew that the financials were 
misstated. And in pari delicto as against Zenda Inc. should not be an available 
defense for Rudolf. His responsibilities as CEO included the corporation’s 
financial statements, which, as an officer of a public company, he signed. To be 
sure, Zenda Inc. likely is subject to liability to other claimants—including 
purchasers of its shares during the episode of the misstated financial 
statements—but Rudolf was responsible to a degree that at least corresponds to 
that of Zenda Inc.43 
 
 38. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 65 (1937); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 53 (Preliminary Draft No. 8, 2006). 
 39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 53, cmt. f 
(Preliminary Draft No. 8, 2006). 
 40. Id. at § 53 (4)(b). 
 41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01, cmt. d(2) (2006). 
 42. For parallel facts, see In re HealthSouth Corp. Shareholder Litig., 845 A.2d 1096, 1100–04 (Del. 
Ch. 2003). 
 43. Nor should it be a defense to Rudolf that subordinates effectuated the fraud. See id. 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
The small number of us who share a keen interest in the common law of 
agency should welcome any expression of interest in a body of doctrine often 
either dismissed as intellectually insipid or (even worse in many ways) 
overlooked altogether. As this paper demonstrates, agency doctrine’s direct 
applicability in the context of odious debt is limited. Nonetheless, agency may 
be powerful as a source of analogy, furnishing as it does a robust body of 
doctrine that addresses the many consequences of representation gone awry. 
